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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. ] 
ROBERT M. McRAE, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. , 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) Case No. 900503 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(d) which established jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from the Circuit Courts. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1 , May the State appeal this case or is it barred by the 
provisions of U.C.A. Section 77-18a-l(2)? 
2. Can a negative inference from Defendant's refusal to 
take field sobriety tests be used to establish probable cause to 
arrest a Defendant for D.U.I.? 
3. Was there probable cause to arrest Defendant for 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol? 
As Appellant is not challenging any of the Findings of Fact 
of the Trial Court (except as noted in the body of this brief), 
but is questioning the legal conclusions based on those facts, 
the standard of review is that dealing with questions of law and 
no particular deference is given to the Trial Court. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC, 
U.C.A, SECTION 77-lSa-l(2) 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from.-
(a) A final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because 
of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of a speedy 
trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or 
any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence when upon a petition for 
review the appellate court decides that the appeal 
would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a criminal case in which Defendant 
was charged with possessing an open container of alcohol in his 
vehicle. Defendant was although he was arrested for suspicion of 
DUI , A procedural inventory search subsequent to the arrest 
yielded an open container. The DUI charges were dropped when the 
results of a blood test were obtained, 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The case was originally filed in Justice Court, but was 
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transferred to Circuit Court prior to trial. Defendant made a 
Motion to Suppress, but no ruling was sought prior to the time 
set for trial. Defendant renewed his motion at trial and the 
Court, in a bench trial, combined the hearing on the motion to 
suppress with the trial, after ascertaining that the State was 
"sufficiently informed" to go forward in the matter. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court granted 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress and dismissed the case and issued 
a "Ruling on Motion to Suppress and Order of Dismissal" in which 
he found the Defendant not guilty. 
D. FACTS 
1. Defendant McRae was arrested on Friday, May 12, 1989, 
and was subsequently charged with having an opened container in 
his vehicle. (Trial Transcript, pp. 11-12, p. 33, lines 2-7.) 
2. Defendant McRae personally filed a Motion to Dismiss 
"on the grounds that there was no probable cause on which the 
search of Defendant's vehicle was predicated." I See Motion to 
Dismiss.) 
3. Defendant did not submit a Memorandum, cite any facts, 
request a hearing, or request a ruling on his Motion to Dismiss. 
(See file.) 
4. Defendant, through counsel Harry Souvall, renewed his 
Motion to Dismiss at trial "based on his claim that the law 
enforcement officer had no probable cause to arrest Defendant, or 
to search his vehicle" (Paragraph 3 of Court's Ruling and Trial 
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Transcript, p. 5, lines 10-12.) 
5. Judge Payne, at a bench trial, combined the hearing on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with the trial on the merits, 
(Paragraph 4 of Court's Ruling). This was done? not so much on 
the consent of the State, as it was based on the State's 
representation that it was "sufficiently informed" as to 
Defendant's motion. (Transcript, page 8, lines 10-17.) 
6. The Trial Court found that "its obvious Mr. McRae's had 
an open container in his vehicle." (Transcript, page 72, lines 
19-20). 
7. The Trial Court found no probable cause to arrest 
Defendant and dismissed the case. (See Transcript, page 79, 
lines 8-10) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . I S THIS APPEAL BARRED BY U . C . A . SECTION 7 7 - 1 8 A - 1 AND 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY? 
I n S t a t e v . W i l l a r d , 147 U t a h Adv . Rep 45 a t 46 ( 1 1 - 1 4 - 9 0 ) , 
t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t a " r u l i n g t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a f a c t u a l 
r e s o l u t i o n i n f a v o r o f t h e D e f e n d a n t o n one o r m o r e o f t h e 
e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d i s a n a c q u i t t a l " , e v e n i f i t i s 
l a b e l e d a d i s m i s s a l , a n d t h e r e f o r e , t h e S t a t e c a n n o t a p p e a l 
p u r s u a n t t o U . C . A . S e c t i o n 7 7 - 1 8 a - l ( 2 ) [ P r e v i o u s l y U t a h R. C r i m 
P . 2 6 ( 3 ) ( a ) a n d U . C . A . S e c t i o n 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 6 ( 3 ) ( a ) ] The C o u r t a l s o 
h e l d t h a t a " D e f e n d a n t o n c e a c q u i t t e d may n o t a g a i n b e s u b j e c t e d 
t o t r i a l w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g t h e d o u b l e j e o p a r d y c l a u s e . T h i s i s 
s o e v e n t h o u g h t h e a c q u i t t a l r e s u l t e d f r o m a n i n c o r r e c t 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e l a w o r a n i m p r o p e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e 
P a g e 4 
facts," (citations omitted.) The appeal in Willard also focused 
on a ruling on a Motion to Suppress, but, unlike this case, a 
hearing was held and a determination made prior to trial. At 
trial when the Motion was renewed, the Judge changed his ruling 
and suppressed the evidence. The Court also cited State v. 
Musselman, 667 P. 2d 1061, (Utah, 1983), as authority for its 
decision in Willard. 
In this case, Defendant sought neither a hearing nor ruling 
on his Motion to Dismiss prior to the trial However, he did 
renew that motion at trial. The State would assert that the 
Defendant in this case, as in Musselman, is seeking to manipulate 
motion practice so as to avoid having to face a valid charge. 
In State v. Musselman, 667 P 2d 1061 fUtah, 1983\, the Court 
stated 
"Indeed, defendant's motion to dismiss could, and 
undoubtedly should, have been made before the trial 
commenced, although the court had the power to consider 
the contention at any time. Section 77-35-12/c^ 'Rule 
12fc) , Utah R . C r i m . P . ) . But the delay neither 
prohibited the defendant from making the motion, nor 
the State from treating it as a motion to dismiss for 
purposes of appealability under Section 77-35-26(cK 
Nor can defendant's delay, as such, determine the 
double jeopardy issue. To allow a defendant to make a 
motion to dismiss solely on legal grounds after the 
trial commenced, instead of prior to trial, and then 
claim double jeopardy if the motion is successful in 
the trial court but reversed on appeal, would permit a 
defendant to manipulate motion practice so as to avoid 
having to face a valid charge. The basic interest that 
the public has in having its laws enforced may not be 
Also see Defendant's Motion with regard to 
Discovery Transcript, page 4, lines 6-25, and page 7, lines 3-
15, where Defendant made a Motion to Dismiss for failure to 
provide discovery in accordance with Rule 16, even though the 
request had been made by telephone the day before the trial. 
so easily circumvented. at 1066. 
The State only represented that it was familiar with 
Defendant's motion and was prepared to proceed with a hearing on 
the motion. It did not consent to waive any appeal it might have 
as a result of the Trial Court's ruling on the motion. 
The State would assert that it was Defendant's burden to 
obtain a hearing and ruling on his motion prior to trial and 
cannot avoid an appeal of the issues raised by the motion by 
waiting until the trial to obtain a ruling on his motion. 
The Judge's oral findings from the bench made it clear that 
Defendant would be guilty but for the ruling on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress, This is not a case where the Defendant was 
found not guilty based on the facts, but was a dismissal based on 
"technicality"-
If Defendant had obtained a ruling on his motion prior to 
trial, the State would be submitting a petition for review under 
U,C.A. Section 77-18a-l(e). But, the Trial Judge dismissed the 
charges. Therefore, the State is appealing a final judgment of 
dismissal pursuant to U.C.A. Section 77-18a-l. 
The dismissal of the charges came five seconds (more or 
less) after the Trial Court ruled on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. The State has made no effort to skirt the restrictions 
of U.C.A. Section 77-18a-l governing appeals. State v. Gomez, 
722 P. 2d 747 (Utah, 1986). The State would request that the 
Appellate Court not allow the Defendant to avoid appeal by his 
failing to obtain a ruling or hearing on his motion prior to 
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trial. Had Defendant's motion been unsuccessful, he certainly 
would have had the opportunity to appeal. As in Musselman, 
Defendant should not be able to manipulate the timing of his 
motion so as to preclude the State from appealing if his motion 
is successful, all while preserving his right to appeal if his 
motion is unsuccessful. 
POINT II. MAY A NEGATIVE INFERENCE BE DRAWN FROM A REFUSAL TO 
TAKE A FIELD SOBRIETY TEST? 
Trooper Gustin cited McRae's refusal to take the field 
sobriety tests as one factor he relied upon in his decision to 
arrest McRae. In Paragraph 19(e), the Court cited Gustin's 
factor as follows: 
"The fact that the Defendant, who is a licensed 
attorney, refused to take a field sobriety test. 
(Trooper Gustin apparently believed that, because the 
Defendant was familiar with the purpose of a field 
sobriety test, his refusal to take the tests was an 
implied admission that he had consumed sufficient 
alcohol so that he could not pass the tests.)" 
The Court then found in Paragraph 20 that: 
"Based upon the above, the Court finds that the 
Defendant had a right not to take the field sobriety 
tests and the exercise of that right cannot be 
construed as evidence of intoxication." 
At Trial, Judge Payne made the following statement: 
"The refusal to take a field sobriety test, I think is, 
when we're dealing with Mr. McRae, who is an attorney, 
well within his rights. I don't think that I can take 
that as an indication that he's intoxicated, if it is 
within his rights not to cooperate with the State in 
gathering evidence which may be used against him, even 
if he were under the influence of alcohol, and even if 
this were a case involving a DUI case, he is not under 
any obligation to do those type of things, and I don't 
think that I am at liberty to assume that because he 
chose not to participate in that, that that is an 
indication that he was intoxicated, and I'm not going 
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to do that." Transcript, p. 74, lines 12-23. 
It seems clear that the Court ruled that the refusal to take 
the field sobriety tests could not be used to establish probable 
cause as Defendant had a right not to take the tests. 
In State v. Erickson, 148 Utah Adv. Rep.45 (11-27-1990), the 
Court held that field sobriety tests do not come within the self-
i n c r i m i n a t i o n provision of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. The Court cited Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2 
at 1173 and held that "the overwhelming weight of authority holds 
that, although a suspect or accused cannot be 'compelled1 to 
perform roadside or field sobriety testy, such tests do not 
violate an accused's privilege against self-incrimination because 
they are non-testimonial in nature." As the tests do not violate 
Defendant's constitutional rights, drawing an adverse opinion 
from a refusal to perform the tests cannot violate Defendant's 
constitutional ri ghts. 
Often, evidence is used to establish probable cause that 
could not be used at trial, i,e., anonymous reliable informants, 
heresay evidence, etc. This evidence could not be used at trial 
without violating wej] established constitutional rights such as 
Defendant's right to confront his accusers. 
POINT III. WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST DEFENDANT? 
I n
 State v. Dronebury, 120 Utah Adv. Rep 28 f 10-20-891
 f the 
Court stated: 
"Because a trial court is in an advantageous position 
to assess witness credibility, 'we will not disturb its 
factual assessment underlying a decision to .., deny a 
suppression motion unless it clearly appears that th<=> 
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lower court was in error.1 State v. Ashe, 745 P. 2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Schlosser, 
774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Griffin, 754 
P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The State is troubled by two (2) of the Court's conclusions 
in this case, one made at trial in the Court!s Oral Findings, and 
one in the written decision with regard to probable cause, both 
of which may involve factual finding and therefore, the standard 
of review would be that stated above in Dronebury. 
Probable cause to arrest means that the officer has 
reasonable grounds or is aware of circumstances which would lead 
a reasonably prudent man to believe in the guilt of the 
Defendant. it is not the equivalent to the knowledge and belief 
necessary to find a man guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or even 
that guilt is more probable than not, but it is more than a bare 
suspicion. It is less than is required to find probable cause at 
a preliminary hearing, but more than the reasonable suspicion 
required for an investigatory stop. See State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778 (Utah, 19 ). At each successive stage, the burden on 
the State and the necessity prove the certainty of guilt grows. 
Inevitably, peace officers are faced with a decision to arrest 
based on incomplete information. It is necessary that the 
information that the officer has at the time of arrest lead him 
to reasonably conclude that guilt is more than a possibility. 
In this case, the Court stated: 
"We have the admission that he drank two cans of beer, 
which is an indication that he had consumed alcohol, 
but certainly not an indication that he had consumed 
sufficient alcohol to be intoxicated with respect to 
Page 9 
the DUI." 
This statement seems to indicate that the Court believes 
that person (in particular, the Defendant) cannot be intoxicated 
after consuming two beers. This conclusion is clearly erroneous. 
Such a determination would have to be determined based on various 
factors, including Defendant's size, the time over which the 
beers were consumed and the particular Defendant's metabolism. 
No such evidence was introduced at trial, and except for 
Defendant's approximate size, none of it was available to the 
officers at the time of arrest. The State would assert that this 
finding is clearly erroneous, and constitutes the basic flaw with 
the Trial Court's determination that there was no probable cause 
to arrest McRae on a DUI charge. 
The other troubling area is the Trial Court's reliance on 
Officer Robert's testimony to establish probable cause (see 
Paragraph 23 of the Court's Ruling), despite the Court's 
conclusion that Robert's testimony "was not complete" and was 
"not extensive with respect to intoxication" and that "(i)n this 
matter, the prosecution did not appear to rely at all upon Deputy 
Roberts on the issue of intoxication. Tt appeared to the Court 
that Roberts was called and testified to establish that the 
Defendant had operated the motor vehicle." The court also found 
in Paragraph 24 that "As indicated at trial;, absent the 
testimony of Deputy Roberts, this Court may have been inclined to 
rely upon Trooper Gustin's obvious integrity in coming to the 
conclusion that the Defendant was intoxicated. The state 
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believes that these findings are inconsistent. 
The State believes that there was probable cause to arrest 
McRae for DUI. Both officers observed the strong odor of alcohol 
and McRae admitted to both officers that he had consumed two (2) 
beers. McRae, an attorney, refused to perform field sobriety 
tests. These facts alone establish probable cause, without the 
numerous additional facts cited by Trooper Gustin. Clearly, 
Trooper Gustin had reason to believe that McRae was DUI and that 
this belief was more than a mere suspicion or possibility. 
CONCLUSION 
The State believes this appeal should be considered because 
the Trial Court's ruling was based solely on the outcome of the 
Motion to Suppress. The State also believes that there was 
probable cause to arrest McRae based on the facts known to the 
officers at the time and that the Trial Court erred, specifically 
in that (a) it did not consider McRae's refusal to take the field 
sobriety tests as establishing probable cause, (b) it concluded 
that two (2) beers was insufficient to render McRae intoxicated, 
and (c) it based its conclusion on Robert's incomplete testimony, 
which was "not extensive with respect to intoxication". 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of February, 1991. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the 8th day of February, 1991, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to Harry H. Souvall, McRAE & DeLAND, 
Attorney for Defendant, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, 




EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : RULING ON MOTION TO 




ROBERT M. MCRAE, : CASE NO. 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on for Trial on March 22, 1990. Herbert Wm. 
Gillespie appeared on behalf of the State. Harry H. Souvall 
appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant was not 
present and through his attorney, waived his right to be present. 
Judge Payne indicated that he was personally acquainted with 
the Defendant in this matter and offerred to recuse himself. Both 
parties, through there respective attorneys, requested that Judge 
Payne hear the case. 
Defendant made a Motion to Dismiss the case on the basis that 
the State had not provided material requested in the discovery 
process. The Court determined that the Discovery Request had not 
been made until March 21, 1990, and denied the Motion. 
Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss which was filed on 
June 27, 1989 based upon his claim that the law enforcement 
officer had no probable cause to stop Defendant, to arrest 
Defendant, or to search his vehicle. 
The Court determined that there had not been a Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion in the Justice Court, that the case had been 
transferred from the Justice Court to the Circuit Court without 
Trial, and that this was not an Appeal from a determination on the 
merits by the Justice Court. The parties stipulated that this 
matter would be treated as though it had been originally filed in 
the Circuit Court. At the request of the parties, the Court 
combined the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with the 
Trial on the merits and proceeded with the Tri~&* +*rH^F££J. upon the 
evidence presented at trial, the Court finds as follows: 
1. That Defendant was stopped at a highway road block 
pursuant to a planned operation which had been reduced to written 
form prior to being implemented. Defendant was stopped in 
accordance with the plan. There was no violation of the 
Defendant's rights with respect to being stopped at the road block 
and the Court finds that a reasonable suspicion existed which 
justified a brief investigatory detention after the initial stop. 
The Defendant was recognized by all law enforcement officers who 
dealt with him as being a prominent criminal defense attorney in 
this area. 
2. There was no evidence as to unusual or unsafe driving. 
The evidence indicated that the Defendant stopped his vehicle in 
compliance with the procedures in effect for the road block. 
After stopping his vehicle, the Defendant pulled his vehicle to 
the side of the road as instructed. The evidence indicates that 
the Defendant responded appropriately as he approached the road 
block, that he slowed and stopped at the road block as was 
indicated by the police officers, and that he pulled his vehicle 
to the side of the road in accordance with the request of the 
officers. 
3. Deputy Roberts of the Duchesne County Sheriff's 
Department was the initial officer who had contact with the 
Defendant after the Defendant had stopped at the road block. 
Deputy Roberts observed the odor of alcohol coming from the 
Defendant's breath and based upon that observation directed the 
Defendant to pull his vehicle to the side of the roadway for 
further investigation. 
4. Roberts then asked the Defendant to exit his vehicle and 
walk to the front of the vehicle. The Defendant did this as 
requested. At the front of the vehicle, the Defendant was 
requested to take a field sobriety test which the Defendant 
declined to take. 
5. After the discussion at the front of the Defendant's 
vehicle, the Defendant again walked back to his vehicle and 
reentered his car. 
6. During Deputy Roberts initial contact with the Defendant, 
he requested and received the Defendant's driver's license. 
Nothing unusual with respect to the production of the license was 
reported. 
7. The evidence clearly indicates that the Defendant 
understood the request and instructions of Deputy Roberts and 
responded appropriately to the same. 
8. The Defendant spoke in a normal speech pattern (that is 
there was no slurred speech). 
9. The Defendant's mental processes were not affected by the 
alcohol that he had consumed. Defendant was able to communicate 
with the officers in a normal fashion. 
10. Deputy Roberts/ who was arguably in the best position to 
observe, did not report anything unusual in the ability of the 
Defendant to exit his vehicle, walk to the front of his vehicle, 
stand while talking to Deputy Roberts at the front of his vehicle, 
walked back, and reentered the vehicle. 
11. Deputy Roberts did not place the Defendant under arrest 
nor testify that he had formed an opinion that the Defendant was 
in violation of the law prohibiting Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol. Indeed, at trial, Deputy Roberts indicated that except 
for the odor of alcohol, there was no other indication that the 
Defendant was intoxicated . 
12. Trooper Gustin, of the Utah Highway Patrol, observed the 
Defendant at the road block and as the Defendant pulled his 
vehicle to the side of the road. Trooper Gustin was some distance 
from the Defendant's car when the Defendant exited his car. 
13. Trooper Gustin noted that the Defendant was unsteady as 
he walked (i.e. he lifted his legs higher than usual in walking 
and seemed to place his foot down carefully). Trooper Gustin did 
not report any other unusual conduct with respect to the 
Defendant's ability to stand or walk. 
14. After the Defendant returned to the vehicle, Deputy 
Roberts went over to Trooper Gustin and requested Trooper Gustin*s 
help in the investigation. Deputy Roberts apparently believed 
Trooper Gustin (who has twenty years experience) to be more 
qualified to handle the investigation. Deputy Roberts informed 
Trooper Gustin that the Defendant had refused to take a field 
sobriety test. From that point on, Trooper Gustin dealt with the 
Defendant. Deputy Roberts had no further contact prior to the 
arrest of the Defendant. 
15. After Deputy Roberts left the Defendant, and while the 
Defendant was seated in his vehicle, Trooper Gustin had a 
converation with the Defendant. During that conversation, Trooper 
Gustin observed that the Defendant's hands were shaking. 
16. Defendant refused to cooperate with Trooper Gustin in 
taking a horizontal eye nystagmus test and was argumentative. 
17. Although Defendant was less than cooperative with Trooper 
Gustin, the evidence indicates clearly that he was able to 
converse with Trooper Gustin in a normal fashion (that is, there 
was no indication of impaired speech, inability to understand, or 
inability to communicate, etc.). 
18. During the interviews with the two officers, the 
Defendant indicated to each officer that he had consumed two 
beers. 
19. Based upon his observations of the Defendant, Trooper 
Gustin formed an opinion that the Defendant was in violation of 
the law with respect to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and 
placed the Defendant under arrest. 
20. The specific factual observations that Trooper Gustin 
relied upon forming his opinions were: 
A. The odor of alcohol. 
B. The Defendant's statement that he had consumed two 
beers. 
C. Trooper Gustin1s observation that the Defendant 
lifted his legs higher than normal and carefully put them down in 
walking to and from the front of the car. 
D. His observations that the Defendant's hands shook. 
E. The fact that the Defendant, who is a licensed 
attorney, refused to take a field sobriety test. (Trooper Gustin 
apparently believed that, because the Defendant was familiar with 
the purpose of a field sobriety test, his refusal to take the 
tests was an implied admission that he had consumed sufficient 
alcohol so that he could not pass the tests.) 
F. Pinkish eyes, erratic mood swings, and beer in the 
vehicle. 
20. Based upon the above, the Court finds that the Defendant 
had a right not to take the field sobriety tests and the exercise 
of that right cannot be construed as evidence of intoxication. 
21. There was no evidence submitted to the Court which would 
indicate that shaking hands are caused by the consumption of 
alcohol. Common experience suggests that there are many causes 
for shaking of the extremities which have nothing to do with the 
consumption of alcohol. Moreover, with respect to alcohol 
consumption, shaking is more often associated with non-consumption 
(that is the "shakes" often experienced by individuals who are 
dependent upon alcohol but who have not consumed the same). Based 
upon the evidence in this case, the Court concludes that the fact 
that the Defendant's hands shook is not probative of 
intoxication. The description of the Defendant's pinkish eyes, 
erratic mood swings, and beer in the vehicle as described, are 
also not highly suggestive of intoxication. 
22. In this type of case, what is not said is often as 
convincing to the Court as what is said. In this case, the 
Defendant was able to do many tasks which would indicate that he 
was not intoxicated within the meaning of the DUI statute. Among 
the indications of sobriety are: 
A. The fact that he was able to recognize the road block and 
respond appropriately to it; 
B. The fact that he was able to pull the vehicle to the side 
of the road as instructed by the officer; 
C. The fact that he was able to produce his driver's license 
without difficulty as requested; 
D. The fact that he was able to exit his vehicle, walk to 
the front of the car, stand and talk with Deputy Roberts, return 
and reenter the vehicle without great difficulty. 
(The Court does not doubt the observations of Trooper Gustin with 
respect to the Defendant's movements. However, in view of the 
fact that he was some distance from the event and in view of the 
fact that the unusual movement was apparently not noticed by 
Deputy Roberts, the Court concludes that the movements of the 
Defendant which were noted by Trooper Gustin were not highly 
suggestive of intoxication. Neither officer reported any 
staggering, any problem with upper body movement while standing, 
use of the vehicle for support, or other common actions of those 
who have been affected by the consumption of alcohol. Indeed, 
Deputy Roberts, who was arguably in the best position to observe, 
and who was undoubtedly looking for the effects of alcohol, did 
not report anything unusual with respect to the conduct of the 
Defendant while outside the vehicle.) 
E. The fact that the Defendant's speech pattern was not 
affected. 
F. The fact that the Defendant was obviously in control of 
his thought processes. The Defendant was able to understand and 
communicate with the officers. 
23. Based upon the testimony of Deputy Roberts, the Court 
concludes that he did not observe facts which would support 
probable cause to arrest. Indeed, in view of the close contact 
that Deputy Roberts had with the Defendant, his testimony could 
only support a finding that the Defendant was not intoxicated 
within the meaning of the DUI statute. 
24. As stated above, the Court is not convinced that the 
shaking of hands is indicative of intoxication. Further, as 
stated above, the fact that the Defendant refused to take the 
field sobriety tests is not evidence of intoxication. With 
respect to the remaining testimony of Trooper Gustin this Court is 
left with his observation that the Defendant smelled of alcohol, 
had blood shot eyes, the Defendant's admission that he consumed 
two beers, Trooper Gustin's observations concerning the 
Defendant's unusual walking, and his mood swings. As indicated at 
Trial, absent the testimony of Deputy Roberts, this Court may have 
been inclined to rely upon Trooper Gustin's obvious integrity in 
coming to the conclusion that the Defendant was intoxicated. The 
affects of alcohol upon the human body are often difficult to 
articulate. To some extent, a verbal description can not 
accurately describe what the officer has observed. There are many 
nuances which bespeak intoxication which cannot be adequately 
articulated. This Court would normally give weight to an 
officer's opinion that an individual was intoxicated in addition 
to the weight given to specific facts that the officer bases his 
opinion on. (In other words, the fact that a witness came to the 
conclusion that the Defendant is intoxicated has weight in 
addition to the specific facts which support an opinion). 
After having observed Trooper Gustin and listening to his 
testimony, the Court is convinced that he honestly believed that 
the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol and acted in good 
faith in making this arrest. It is significant to note that he 
apparently did not have an opportunity to discuss his observations 
with Deputy Roberts and was not aware that Deputy Roberts had not 
observed anything unusual concerning the Defendant's walking. 
Therefore, he gave his observation of the Defendant's walking 
weight which, in view of Roberts' testimony, the Court cannot. 
In order to support an arrest, the Court must find facts 
which would justify a reasonable police officer to believe that a 
public offense had been committed in the officer's presence. In 
this case we have two officers who apparently came to different 
conclusions concerning the Defendant's condition. (Although 
Roberts did not affirmatively indicate that the Defendant was not 
intoxicated, no other conclusion would be supported by his 
testimony). While the observation of Trooper Gustin may have 
supported an arrest (if given the full weight of the 
observations), after considering the testimony of both officers, 
the Court concludes that probable cause for arrest did not exist. 
When there is a conflict in to the evidence, the trier of 
fact is given the duty to resolve the conflict and in doing so I 
conclude that a reasonable officer who observed the Defendant walk 
to and from his vehicle would not have found his movement highly 
suggestive of intoxication. The fact that Roberts did not observe 
the reported unusual steps and the fact that no other movement 
suggestive of intoxication (i.e. staggering steps, upper body 
movement, difficulty in exiting the vehicle, use of the vehicle as 
support) was reported, compel the Court to come to this conclusion. 
In ruling on this matter, it is not the intent of the 
undersigned that this matter will constitute res judicata in any 
other proceeding and to the extent the Court may limit its 
findings to this case, the Court's finding shall not consitute res 
judicata in any civil proceeding. This is especially true because 
the Court believes that the testimony of Roberts was not 
complete. In this matter the prosecution did not appear to rely 
at all upon Deputy Roberts on the issue of intoxication. It 
appeared to the Court that Roberts was called and testified to 
establish that the Defendant had operated the motor vehicle. As 
indicated above, the Court is compelled to conclude that Roberts 
did not believe that the Defendant was intoxicated. However, 
because the examination of Roberts was not extensive with respect 
to intoxication, the Court believes that res judicata with respect 
to the probable cause for arrest ought not to apply. 
Based upon the above, the Court finds that probable cause for 
the arrest did not exist. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress all 
evidence which was gathered subsequent to the arrest is, 
therefore, granted. Based upon the evidence which was submitted 
to the Court prior to the arrest, the Court finds reasonable doubt 
as to the crime charged and finds the Defendant not guilty. 
DATED this 14th of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNEf CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
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